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GIVING AN INCH, THEN TAKING
A MILE: HOW THE GOVERNMENT'S
UNRESTRICTED RECOVERY OF
CONDITIONAL MEDICARE PAYMENTS
DESTROYS PLAINTIFFS' CHANCES AT




On a snowy February morning, Susan Smith, a retired
nursery school teacher, aged seventy, who had generally been in
good health her whole life, slipped and fell on the steps to her
apartment. Ms. Smith's fractured ankle required surgery to heal
properly. Although she had a modest retirement cushion, Ms.
Smith could not cover the costs of surgery and rehabilitation.
Luckily, Ms. Smith had some assistance from Medicare, enabling
her to pay for the metal rods and bolts the doctors installed in
her bones to allow for proper healing. Unluckily, Ms. Smith
suffered a severe infection following the surgery, resulting from
poor aftercare. Unable to return home, Ms. Smith endured an
extended, painful recovery in a nursing home. Weighed down by
the unanticipated medical expenses, Ms. Smith contacted an
attorney to learn what compensation she might recover if she
sued the hospital. The attorney informed Ms. Smith that while
she could recover a substantial sum, the amount recovered would
likely be significantly reduced in light of the fact that the
government would be entitled to recover from such a lawsuit any
amount that Medicare had paid for Ms. Smith's treatment. Ms.
Smith decided to sue, and her attorney notified Centers for
Medicare & Medicaid Services ("CMS") that the suit would be
brought.
t Senior Articles Editor, St. John's Law Review, J.D. Candidate, 2010, St. John's
University School of Law; M.A. Psychology, 2007, University at Albany.
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Ms. Smith sued the hospital alleging negligence and medical
malpractice, hoping to receive compensation for her past and
future expenses and troubles. Ms. Smith alleged damages of
$110,000 in medical expenses (of which Medicare paid $50,000);
$10,000 in lost wages and future earning potential; and $80,000
in pain and suffering. The claim for damages totaled $200,000.
The case quickly settled for $50,000.1 After the settlement funds
were dispersed, the Secretary of Health and Human Services
filed suit against Ms. Smith and her attorney under the Medicare
Secondary Payer Act ("MSP"), seeking reimbursement for the
$50,000 Medicare had paid on Ms. Smith's behalf.2
If the government is entitled to recover its entire claim, Ms.
Smith will be left uncompensated for her injuries and more
dependent than ever on public assistance. When a Medicare
beneficiary settles, one can infer that the beneficiary has been
compensated for a portion of each damage claim. Thus, Ms.
Smith recovered only twenty-five percent of the total value of her
damages, suggesting she was not fully compensated for any one
of her damage claims, but rather compensated for a portion of
each. As a general matter, the government is justified in
recouping payments it made through Medicare because this
money was paid out by the government, not by Ms. Smith. If the
government recoups its entire $50,000 payout, however, it will
actually be recovering the portion of money designed to
compensate Ms. Smith for non-Medicare related costs, such as
her out of pocket medical expenses, pain and suffering, and
future care costs. Because the MSP does not directly address the
issue of apportioned recovery,' the statute should be read to
limit the government's recovery to only those settlement funds
intended to compensate her for past medical expenses paid for by
Medicare.
This Note argues that the government's recovery of
conditional Medicare payments should be limited to those
settlement proceeds designated for past medical expenses, calling
for a reconciliation of the government's financial interests and
ISee Zinman v. Shalala, 67 F.3d 841, 843 (9th Cir. 1995) (discussing a
hypothetical scenario).
2 See Rick Swedloff, Can't Settle, Can't Sue: How Congress Stole Tort Remedies
from Medicare Beneficiaries, 41 AKRON L. REV. 557, 558 (2008).
See Zinman, 67 F.3d at 845 (citing United States v. Travelers Ins. Co., 815 F.
Supp. 521, 523 (D. Conn. 1992)).
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the plaintiffs compensatory interests in the tort system. Part I
of this Note discusses the evolution of Medicare's and Medicaid's
role as public medical insurance programs. This Part also
examines the confusion regarding the extent of the government's
reimbursement rights. Part II addresses the Supreme Court's
recent decision in Arkansas Department of Health & Human
Services v. Ahlborn,' which held that Medicaid reimbursements
are limited to those settlement funds intended to compensate the
plaintiff for past medical expenses. Part III argues that this
limited recovery rule should extend to Medicare reimbursements
in light of similar language in the Medicaid and Medicare
statutes, as well as the common need to balance the
government's statutory rights with the tort system's
compensation goals. Part IV provides a suggestion as to how
courts should implement the limited recovery rule.
I. DISCUSSION
A. The History of Medicaid and Medicare: The Government's
Evolving Role as a Healthcare Insurer
Medicare and Medicaid are the two major government-
sponsored health care programs, which together provide health
care insurance to approximately one in four Americans.5 The
programs are both administered on the federal level by CMS, an
agency under the United States Department of Health & Human
Services ("HHS").6 CMS, originally called the Health Care
Financing Administration,7 was created to combine under one
roof "the oversight of the Medicare program [and] the Federal
portion of the Medicaid program."" Although the programs are
' 547 U.S. 268 (2006).
5 See U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, HHS: What We Do,
httpJ/www.hhs.gov/about/whatwedo.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2010) [hereinafter
HHS: What We Do].
6 See id.
7 See U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Letter from William L.
Engelhardt, http://www.cms.hhs.gov/CMSAlumni (last visited Mar. 21, 2010).
8 U.S. Department of Health & Human Services, Health Care Financing
Administration, httpJ/www.hhs.gov/about/opdivshcfa.html (last visited Mar. 21,
2010).
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structured differently, they have the same goal: protecting the
health of Americans, "especially... those who are least able to
help themselves."9
Unfortunately, the government's desire to maximize its
recovery has jeopardized these goals. Implementation of the
programs has evolved over the years in ways that have hurt
those the programs were intended to help, while simultaneously
threatening the function of the tort system as a means of
compensation.
1. Program Basics
Medicaid was enacted in 1965 as a publicly funded program
to ensure that certain individuals who lack the resources to cover
the cost of essential medical services would have access to health
care. 10  Under Medicaid, the federal government and the
individual state governments share the cost of paying for the
health care services of low-income citizens." Each state
establishes and implements its own Medicaid program in
compliance with certain federal requirements, including who
should be eligible for aid and how to administer the program. In
return, the federal government pays for the majority of costs that
each state incurs.
12
Medicare, also enacted in 1965,1 supports a smaller group of
people. Medicare provides the funding of medical care for those
over the age of sixty-five, those who are younger than sixty-five
and have been recipients of Social Security disability benefits for
at least twenty-four months, those suffering from end-stage renal
disease, and the permanently disabled. 4
2. The Government's Reimbursement Right
From its inception, Congress intended Medicaid to be "the
payer of last resort."15 To participate in Medicaid, states are
required to seek reimbursement of benefits paid whenever there
is a liable third party-such as the beneficiary's own insurer-as
9 HHS: What We Do, supra note 5.
10 See Norwest Bank of N.D. v. Doth, 159 F.3d 328, 331 (8th Cir. 1998);
42 C.F.R. § 430.0 (2010).
11 See 42 C.F.R. § 430.0.
12 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(b) (2006).
13 See Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286.
14 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395c.
15 S. REP. No. 99-146, at 311 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 264, 278.
[Vol. 84:305
GIVING AN INCH, THEN TAKING A MILE
well as tortfeasors and their liability insurers. To effectuate this
federal mandate, each state must enact laws to enable recovery
for payments made for medical services on behalf of Medicaid
beneficiaries.16
Unlike Medicaid, Medicare was intended to be the primary
payer of medical services for Medicare beneficiaries from the
time it was signed into law.17 As originally enacted, the program
would pay for "medical services supplied to a beneficiary, even
when such services were covered by other insurance such as an
employer group health plan or liability insurance.""8
The growing costs of the program, however, prompted
Congress to amend the program, shifting Medicare from the
primary payer of medical care to the payer of last resort.19
Congress passed an amendment to section 1862(b) of the Social
Security Act, now known as the MSP.2° The MSP, "for the first
time since Medicare's inception ... made Medicare's liability
secondary to additional sources of payment for Medicare
beneficiaries' medical costs and services."21 Medicare will not pay
for any service or item in which "payment has been made or can
reasonably be expected to be made" by a primary plan, such as
workers' compensation, self-insured plans, or liability
insurance.22 Medicare will, however, make payments when a
Medicare recipient cannot expect to receive prompt payment
from such third-party payers,23 on the condition that such
payments are reimbursed to Medicare when payment for such
16 See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396a(a)(18), 1396p(a)-(b) (West 2010). These recovery
mandates are not, however, without limitation. Federal law specifically prohibits
states from recovering payments from the property of the Medicaid beneficiary. See
id. §§ 1396a(a)(18), 1396p(a).
17 See Zinman v. Shalala, 67 F.3d 841, 843 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Health Ins.
Ass'n of Am. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
s Zinman, 67 F.3d at 843.
19 See id. (explaining that the MSP legislation was enacted in response
to "skyrocketing Medicare costs"); In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 451 F. Supp.
2d 458, 465 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) ("The [MSP] ... sought to lower Medicare's
expenses.. . ."). See generally Swedloff, supra note 2, at 572 ("Medicare expenses
rapidly expanded beyond Congress' initial expectation, and Congress scrambled to
reign in the program's spending.").
20 See Swedloff, supra note 2, at 574.
21 Id.
22 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2010).
2 See id. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(i).
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services are received.24 As a result, Congress successfully cut the
costs of the program by "requiring that Medicare pay 'secondary'
to alternate sources,"25 ultimately "shifting the costs of
beneficiaries' medical care from the Medicare program to private
sources of payment."26
Despite the clearly stated purpose of the MSP, the
government had limited success recovering under the statute's
complex language as originally drafted. 7  The government's
string of unsuccessful recovery efforts can be attributed to the
significant differences in interpretation of the MSP among the
courts. 28 The government turned its attention to the high-profile
mass tort settlements in the late 1990s and sought to recover
Medicare's expenditures from the alleged tortfeasors who settled
with Medicare beneficiaries.29
The government found a novel theory to justify
reimbursement from tort settlements because recovery under
such circumstances was not clearly authorized by the MSP. The
government argued that it could recover from settlement funds
because the MSP authorized recovery against "primary plans,"
24 See id. § 1395y(b)(2)(B) (explaining that any payment under this subchapter
with respect to an item or service shall be conditioned on reimbursement when
notice or other information of the primary's plan responsibility is received by such
primary plan).
25 Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n v. Sullivan, 794 F. Supp. 1166, 1169 (D.D.C.
1992); see also United States v. Baxter Int'l, Inc., 174 F. Supp. 2d 1242, 1250 (N.D.
Ala. 2001) (discussing the purpose and structure of the MSP), rev'd, 345 F.3d 866,
875 (11th Cir. 2003).
26 Swedloff, supra note 2, at 575.
27 See Baxter, 345 F.3d 866, 875 (11th Cir. 2003) ("[The statute is structurally
complex-a complexity that has produced considerable confusion among [the] courts
attempting to construe it."); see also Estate of Urso v. Thompson, 309 F. Supp. 2d
253, 259 (D. Conn. 2004) (noting that the Medicare statute is "convoluted and
complex and such a model of un-clarity"); Brown v. Thompson, 252 F. Supp. 2d 312,
317 n.5 (E.D. Va. 2003) ("There is no doubt that the MSPS is not a model of clarity
and coherence."), affd, 374 F.3d 253 (4th Cir. 2004).
" See Norma S. Schmidt, The King Kong Contingent: Should the Medicare
Secondary Payer Statute Reach to Future Medical Expenses in Personal Injury
Settlements?, 68 U. Pirrr. L. REV. 469, 472-73 (2006) (discussing CMS's "mixed
success in its early attempts to recover Medicare liens" due to varied statutory
interpretations of the MSP); see also In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 451 F. Supp.
2d 458, 465 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) ("For many years courts were divided about the
propriety of the federal government's attempts to recover Medicare expenditures
under the MSP in cases involving settled tort claims.").
' See Swedloff, supra note 2, at 579.
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which included a "self-insured plan."" Since the statute did not
define "self-insured plan," the government argued that the
alleged tortfeasors were "self-insured" because they chose to
carry their own risk in lieu of purchasing an insurance policy,
ultimately paying their own money out to the Medicare
beneficiaries who were plaintiffs in the suit.3 1
Ultimately, the government's position was rejected because
it represented a significant departure from prior understandings
of the MSP.12 District courts throughout the country concluded
that the plain language of the statute precluded the government
from recovering from an individual beneficiary's settlement of
claims. 3 The Fifth Circuit in Thompson v. Goetzman,34 the first
appellate level court to rule on the matter, "agree[d] with
the... district courts that have concluded that an alleged
tortfeasor who settles with a plaintiff is not, ipso facto, a 'self-
insurer' under the MSP statute."35 Therefore, an uninsured
defendant without a formal self-insurance plan did not constitute
a "primary plan" from which Medicare was authorized under
the MSP to recover conditional payments from. Such courts
reasoned that "the Government's MSP cause of action arises
when the 'primary plan' is obligated to pay for the primary care
at issue under a contract of insurance, not when the payment
obligation arises out of tort litigation."36 The Thompson Court
focused primarily on the statutory text, explaining that, if "the
plain language of the MSP statute produces the legislatively
30 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2006); Thompson v. Goetzmann, 337 F.3d
489, 495 (5th Cir. 2003).
31 See Thompson, 337 F.3d at 495.
32 See Health Ins. Ass'n of Am. v. Shalala, 23 F.3d 412, 427 n.* (D.C. Cir. 1994)
(Henderson, J., concurring) (concluding that the statute was intended "to allow
recovery only from an insurer"); United States v. Philip Morris Inc., 116 F. Supp. 2d
131, 146 n.22 (D.D.C. 2000) ("Courts have uniformly recognized that the statute's
clear purpose was to grant the Government a right to recover Medicare costs from
[insurers].").
3 See Thompson, 337 F.3d at 494 ("[TIhe government has litigated similar cases
in several district courts around the country... [and] the government's prior efforts
have proved uniformly feckless-every court that has heard its arguments on this
issue... has rejected the government's expansive interpretation of the MSP
statute.").
34 Id.
I Id. at 497.
'6 In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 2001 WL 283163, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
21, 2001); see also Thompson, 337 F.3d at 498.
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unintended result claimed by the government, the government's
complaint should be addressed to Congress, not to the courts, for
such revision as Congress may deem warranted, if any."
31
Congress amended the MSP in 2003 to reflect
growing concerns about the statute's intended application, 8
simultaneously ensuring that tortfeasors would be a new source
of reimbursement.3 9  Congress defined "self-insured plan" to
include an entity that "carries its own risk ... in whole or in
part."40  This change brought settling tortfeasors under the
umbrella of self-insuring entities from whom the government
could recover.41 After the 2003 amendments, the MSP "plainly
entitles Medicare to reimbursement of any payment it makes for
medical services if a primary plan later pays for those medical
services as part of a settlement agreement."
42
B. Remaining Issues: The Scope of the MSP and What It Means
for Medicare Beneficiaries Attempting To Settle Tort Suits
The government has seen successful recovery efforts since
the amendments,43 but questions remain regarding the full
scope of the government's recovery rights under the MSP. There
is no disagreement that the government is entitled to recoup
Medicare expenditures when a judgment, arbitration agreement,
or settlement specifically includes consideration for past medical
expenses." The statute does not clearly state recovery rights in
other situations, however, such as when personal injury
settlements specifically exclude past medical expenses, or a
release provides that Medicare retains its right to bring an
37 Thompson, 337 F.3d at 493.
" The amendment was made by enacting the Medicare Prescription Drug,
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 301, 117 Stat.
2066, 2221.
31 See Swedloff, supra note 2, at 582 ("Congress moved swiftly to amend the
MSP to reflect the government's failed litigation positions.").
40 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(A) (West 2010).
41 See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
42 See Brown v. Thompson, 374 F.3d 253, 258 (4th Cir. 2004).
43 Thereafter, more courts held that the MSP entitled the government to its fair
share of the individual Medicare beneficiary's tort settlement. See, e.g., Estate of
Urso v. Thompson, 309 F. Supp. 2d 253, 256-59 (D. Conn. 2004); Brown v.
Thompson, 252 F. Supp. 2d 312, 319 (E.D. Va. 2003), affd, 374 F.3d 253.
"See J. Michael Hayes, Are Medicare, Medicaid, and ERISA Liens?, 79 N.Y. ST.
B.J. 28, 29 (2007).
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independent action.45  Settlements have been particularly
problematic because the MSP "does not address the issue of
apportioned recovery of conditional Medicare payments, either by
its language or by its structure."4"
If Medicare pays for services that later become the subject of
a medical malpractice suit that settles, should the government
be entitled to recover its full expenditures from the Medicare
beneficiary's settlement proceeds? If the Medicare expenditure
total is so high that full reimbursement would essentially wipe
out the plaintiffs recovery, would it instead be more just to
apportion the settlement proceeds and limit the government's
recoupment to only that portion of the settlement allocated for
past medical expenses? If Medicare's recovery should be limited
in that manner, how should courts determine the amount paid in
the absence of an express allocation for past medical expenses? 4 7
Left unresolved, the government will surely seek to maximize its
recovery, hurting individual Medicare beneficiaries, but more
importantly, threatening the tort system's compensation goals by
destroying the incentive to sue.48
II. LIMITATIONS ON STATE MEDICAID RECOVERY UNDER
AHLBORN
In 2006, the Supreme Court, in Arkansas Department of
Health & Human Services v. Ahlborn,49 resolved these issues
with regard to Medicaid, stating that the federal Medicaid
statute limits the government's recovery to compensation for past
medical expenses.5 ° Prior to Ahlborn, there was a split among
courts. Some held that the state was entitled to recover on its
Medicaid lien from any liability claim asserted against a third
party by the Medicaid beneficiary, regardless of the damage
41 See id. at 29-30.
4 See Zinman v. Shalala, 67 F.3d 841, 845 (9th Cir. 1995).
41 See Lugo v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 13 Misc. 3d 681, 682-83, 819 N.Y.S.2d 892,
893 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 2006) (enumerating similar issues relating to the New
York Medicaid agency's right of recovery in a medical malpractice suit).
" See Irma S. Russell, The Logic of Legal Remedies and the Relative Weight of
Norms: Assessing the Public Interest in the Tort Reform Debate, 39 AKRON L. REV.
1053, 1064-65 (2006) (discussing the compensatory goals of tort law).
49 547 U.S. 268 (2006).
50 See id. at 280.
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calculation.51  In those courts, the government could claim
reimbursement from the pool of money intended to compensate
the victim not only for medical expenses, but also for pain,
suffering, and lost wages. Other courts took the position that the
state's right of recovery was limited to the portion of money
intended to compensate for past medical expenses.52
Heidi Ahlborn, a nineteen year-old college student,
became Medicaid eligible after a car accident left her severely
brain-damaged.53 Arkansas Department of Health and Human
Services ("ADHS"), the state Medicaid agency, paid $215,645.30
for medical services to health care providers on Ahlborn's
behalf.54  Ahlborn initiated a tort lawsuit in state court,
which settled for $550,000, with no allocation between medical
and nonmedical expenses.55 Medicaid asserted a right to full
reimbursement for the $215,645.30 it paid out.56 Although the
parties eventually stipulated that the settlement of $550,000
represented one-sixth the value of her tort claim,57 the question
remained whether Medicaid repayment would be deducted from
Ahlborn's entire claim or, instead, deducted only from a portion
of the claim attributable to past medical expenses.
The Supreme Court sided with Ahlborn, rejecting the state
agency's claim entitling it to more than the portion of Ahlborn's
settlement representing medical expenses.58 The Supreme Court
explained that while the Arkansas statute required recoupment
from,59 and placed a lien on,6" the entire third-party payment, the
federal Medicaid statute "does not sanction an assignment of
rights to payment for anything other than medical expenses-not
51 See, e.g., Houghton v. Dep't of Health, 57 P.3d 1067, 1069 (Utah 2002); Wilson
v. State, 10 P.3d 1061, 1066 (Wash. 2000); Calvanese v. Calvanese, 93 N.Y.2d 111,
116, 710 N.E.2d 1079, 688 N.Y.S.2d 479 (1999).
52 See, e.g., Martin ex rel. Hoff v. City of Rochester, 642 N.W.2d 1, 13 (Minn.
2002).
5' Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 272-73.
r Id. at 273.
55 Id. at 274.
5 Id.
57 Id.
' Id. at 291-92.
59 ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-77-302(a) (2009) (stating that when a Medicaid recipient
brings a claim against a liable third party, "any settlement, judgment, or award
obtained is subject to the division's claim for reimbursement of the benefits provided
to the recipient under the medical assistance program").
' See supra text accompanying note 42.
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lost wages, not pain and suffering, not an inheritance."61
Additionally, "the federal statute places express limits on the
State's powers to pursue recovery" by requiring compliance with
the federal anti-lien provision,62 which "generally prevents a
State from attaching property of a recipient to reimburse the
State for benefits paid under a state Medicaid plan."63 Under the
Arkansas law, Medicaid beneficiaries must automatically assign
to the ADHS their full rights to recoveries, 64 creating an
automatic lien on any funds the Medicaid recipient received from
a third party.65 The Court acknowledged that while Congress
clearly intended Medicaid to be the payer of last resort, that did
not mean Congress intended the government
to be able to "seek reimbursement from Medicaid recipients
themselves; in fact, with the possible exception of a lien on
payments for medical care, the statute expressly prohibits liens
against the property of Medicaid beneficiaries."66
III. ANALYSIS
It is unclear whether Ahlborn will also govern Medicare
reimbursement rights because Ahlborn is specific to Arkansas's
Medicaid program and does not automatically extend to the
implementation of the federal Medicare program. Additionally,
Medicaid and Medicare are governed by different statutes.
Certain portions of the ruling, such as the rejection of Arkansas's
automatic assignment provision, are wholly inapplicable because
there is no comparable federal anti-lien provision in the MSP.
The government's recovery rights are considered more
extensive for Medicare payments than for Medicaid payments,
further clouding whether a limited right of recovery under
Medicaid also applies to Medicare. Medicare's conditional
payments create a lien, "tak[ing] precedence over any other claim
against settlement proceeds, including those of Medicaid, and
trumps even the injured party's right to reimbursement."67 Some
commentators describe the government's right of recovery under
61 Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 281.
62 Id. at 283.
6' Ahlborn v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 397 F.3d 620, 623 (8th Cir. 2005),
affd, 547 U.S. 268.
' See ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-77-307(a).
' See id. § 20-77-307(c).
66 Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 291-92.
67 Schmidt, supra note 28, at 474.
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the Medicare statutes as a "super lien."68 Others suggest that the
government's right of recovery under the Medicare statutes has
been exaggerated.69
The government's reimbursement rights under Medicare are
strong, but the MSP's language and principles are not so
different from the federal Medicaid statute such that the latter
should be interpreted to protect plaintiffs while the MSP
endangers their recoveries. This Note argues that the
government's right to recover Medicare payments should be
limited to the portion of settlement funds representing
compensation for past medical expenses.
A. The Statutes Governing Medicare and Medicaid Repayment
Obligations Are Best Understood as Similarly Limiting the
Government's Recovery Right
Medicare and Medicaid share the same enabling legislation
and basic repayment obligations. The Medical Care Recovery Act
of 19627o has commonly been recognized as the enabling
legislation.7' The statute recognizes the government's recovery
rights but also suggests that right is not without limits,
authorizing only "the reasonable value of the care and treatment
so furnished [or] paid for."72
The language of the federal Medicare statute has been
interpreted to limit the government's recovery to the plaintiffs
recovery for past medical expenses, and the Medicare statute
should be as well. The Medicaid Act provides that as a condition
6 See Timothy V. Hoffman & George L. Acosta, Beware of the "Super Lien":
Medicare Payments' Effect on Personal Injury Cases, 81 ILL. B.J. 81, 81 (1993)
(noting that the Medicare lien is unique because "federal regulations grant Medicare
subrogation and lien rights superior to any other lien or interest on any settlement
or judgment proceeds. These rights apply even though no... notice was sent out and
even when the liability insurer and parties' attorneys are not aware that payments
had been made by Medicare."); see also Thomas J. Nyzio, Medicare Recovery in
Liability Cases, 7 S.C. LAW. 20, 20 n.al (1996).
61 See Sally Hart, Recovery Powers Under Medicare's Secondary Payer Program,
J. ASS'N TRIAL LAW. AM., Sept. 1997, at 54. Hart also suggests that an overzealous
interpretation of the government's recovery rights under Medicare could lead to a
breach of attorney professional obligations to their client. She contends that if
attorneys act as if the Medicare lien is a super lien, priority payments to the
government may create situations where payment was not warranted at all. Id. at
58.
70 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(B) (West 2010).
7 See, e.g., Hayes, supra note 44.
712 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
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of eligibility, a Medicaid recipient must "assign the State any
rights... to payment for medical care from any third party."73
The Supreme Court determined that this portion of the federal
third-party liability provision suggested that ADHS could not
"lay claim to more than the portion of Ahlborn's settlement
that represents medical expenses."74 Similarly, the MSP enables
the government to recoup funds from primary plans having
"responsibility to make payment with respect to such item or
service."75 The Ninth Circuit has noted that "[n]othing in [the
statute's] language. .. compels the conclusion that Congress
intended to limit the amount of recovery for a conditionally paid
'item or service' to a proportionate share of a discounted
settlement."76 The Ninth Circuit has also conceded that it was
"clear from the statute that the references to [the] 'item or
service' [were] intended to define the payments for which
Medicare has a right to reimbursement."77 Thus, it is reasonable
to conclude that the government's reimbursement rights under
Medicare were intended to be limited to payments made by the
defendant for the plaintiffs past medical services, not unrelated
compensation, such as pain and suffering.
There are significant differences between the Medicare and
federal Medicaid statutes, but disparities in the administration of
the programs or reimbursement procedures do not translate into
statutorily prescribed differences in amounts recoverable. For
example, the Medicaid statute is based upon an assignment of
rights intended to further recovery. States are obligated to enact
laws under which the state acquires the Medicaid beneficiary's
right to seek reimbursement from third parties found liable to
pay for medical bills and services.7 The state then reimburses
the federal government to the extent it helped finance the
medical assistance.79 In contrast, the MSP establishes that
Medicare will make conditional payments, subject to recovery
when a third-party payer is deemed responsible for items and
11 Id. § 1396k(a)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
14 See Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 280
(2006).
75 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii) (emphasis added).
76 Zinman v. Shalala, 67 F.3d 841, 844 (9th Cir. 1995).
77 Id.
78 See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(25)(H) (West 2010); 42 U.S.C. 1396k(a)(1)(A).
79 See 42 U.S.C. § 1396k(b).
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services provided by Medicare. 0 Medicare's right of recovery is
more direct than Medicaid's, but nothing in the language
suggests that the government is entitled to recover any more
under Medicaid than under Medicare.
Statutory differences in the way the government may recoup
funds from each program are better explained by differences in
the way the programs are administered. Medicaid programs
are created and run by each individual state, whereas Medicare
is a federal program." Recovery of federal funds under each
program requires different procedures to meet those goals, with
Medicare requiring stronger recovery rights since there is no
state oversight. For example, the MSP has a double damages
provision, whereas the federal Medicaid statutes do not. The
MSP grants "CMS the right to collect double damages plus
interest for any attempt at cost shifting from a primary payer
onto Medicare."82 While this may be seen as evidence of the
government's "super" recovery powers, the provision is better
understood as a reflection of the government's desire to reduce
Medicare expenditures. First, it acts as a deterrent against cost
shifting, thereby ensuring compliance with reimbursement
requirements. Second, it provides an additional influx of money
from which the government can reimburse itself without
compromising funds needed to compensate tort victims.
B. Protecting Medicare Payment Recovery While Maintaining
the Tort System
The government's interest in recoupment of Medicare funds
must be balanced with the tort system's goal of compensating
victims. Allowing the government unlimited recovery of
Medicare expenses from tort settlements threatens the efficiency
of the tort system because diminished recovery will discourage
(1) plaintiffs from bringing suit, (2) attorneys from taking claims,
and (3) defendants from settling. Limiting recovery to those
funds representing compensation for past medical expenses will
enable the government to decrease expenditures while also
ensuring that tort victims are compensated. This will also
decrease the tort victims' dependence on federal assistance. The
See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(B).
81 See supra Part II.A.
Schmidt, supra note 28, at 474 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(A)).
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government need not worry that parties to the suit will negotiate
away its interest because the government is well equipped
to recover on its own, and statutory provisions already in
place provide additional incentives for parties to protect the
government's interests.
1. Granting the Government Full Recovery Rights Threatens
the Tort System's Ability To Compensate
The tort system can effectively compensate victims only if
it is structured so that plaintiffs have adequate incentives to
seek redress for their wrongs. The tort system seeks to make
aggrieved parties whole, but this can only be accomplished if the
injured party seeks redress, has the resources to pursue the case,
and will actually be compensated for his or her harm. 3 Through
the tort system, the burden of making the victim whole is placed
upon the person who is most justly burdened with the cost.'
Society has a strong interest in ensuring that claims come
forward and victims are adequately compensated because those
costs might otherwise continue to be born by public financing.
8 5
Interpreting the MSP to grant the government full recovery,
rights would threaten the tort system's ability to make plaintiffs
whole because high costs deter plantiffs from seeking redress,
attorneys from accepting cases, and defendants from settling.
The harsh effects of a broad recovery right have been felt by
plaintiffs and acknowledged by judges. Because plaintiffs are the
last entity to receive funds from a settlement, 6 they can easily be
left with little or no compensation." Judge Weinstein noted that
I In general, plaintiffs will likely bring a claim if they expect that the benefits
from a favorable judgment or settlement will outweigh the cost of achieving that
outcome. See Swedloff, supra note 2, at 599. See generally Robert D. Cooter & Daniel
L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1067 (1989) (discussing the economic gains and losses involved in legal
dispute resolution).
8 See Benjamin C. Zipurksy, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J.
695, 695 (2003) ("American tort law recognizes the corrective justice ideal by
providing a mechanism through which defendants who have wrongfully injured
plaintiffs are required to compensate those plaintiffs for their injuries, and thereby
make them whole insofar as this is practically possible.").
' See Russell, supra note 48, at 1064 (noting that tort law protects the public
from the responsibility of compensation).
" See 42 U.S.C. § 1396k(b) (2006) (stating that the state and federal government
collect first, with the remainder paid to the Medicare beneficiary and his or her
attorney).
87 See, e.g., Zinman v. Shalala, 67 F.3d 841, 844-45 (9th Cir. 1995).
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this harsh, but real, result of the full reimbursement approach
"gives many beneficiaries little incentive to pursue valid claims
or, if they do, to accept otherwise reasonable settlement offers,
thereby tending to push them into uncertain litigation that
burdens the courts and may result in little or no recovery for
either the beneficiaries or for Medicare or Medicaid."8 8 A full
reimbursement rule would ultimately defeat the core values of
the Medicare and Medicaid programs by "depriv[ing] poor and
injured individuals of needed compensation for their pain and
suffering, lost wages, and other non-medical damages."89
Additionally, allowing the government full recovery from
settlements makes Medicare beneficiaries undesirable clients
for medical malpractice attorneys because it reduces their net
recovery. Plaintiffs' attorneys will only agree to representation
when they believe it is profitable to do so. A medical malpractice
case involving a Medicare lien, subject to full recovery, would
reduce the value of the case for a number of reasons. First, there
are higher costs associated with the representation because
Medicare beneficiary cases are more likely to go to trial than to
settle.90 Additionally, after higher costs to obtain diminished
rewards, the attorney's fee may still be reduced or completely
eliminated. The MSP provides that the Secretary may recover
conditional payments made by Medicare from "any entity
that ... receive[s] payment from a primary plan."91  Thus,
attorneys who accept contingency fees from a tortfeasor's payout
are subject to the Secretary's right of recovery. These rising costs
and reduced expected benefits would discourage plaintiffs'
attorneys from bringing a suit with the ultimate result that
tort victims will be harder pressed to find adequate legal
representation, and thus, less likely to seek compensation for
their injuries.
Finally, defendants are discouraged from settling lawsuits
with Medicare beneficiaries because of increased costs as a result
of repayment obligations.92 Settlements should be encouraged
because they compensate victims in an efficient manner.9 3 After
" In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 451 F. Supp. 2d 458, 470 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
89 Id.
91 See infra notes 92-98 and accompanying text.
91 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii) (West 2010).
w See Swedloff, supra note 2, at 588 ("It should be intuitively obvious that
Medicare beneficiaries will have difficulty settling tort claims under the MSP.").
9 See Schmidt, supra note 28, at 484.
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the 2003 amendments to the MSP, however, settlements are
less desirable to defendants because "[a]ny time a Medicare
beneficiary compromises or releases his claims in exchange for a
settlement with an alleged tortfeasor, a court must hold that
the alleged tortfeasor has a primary plan under the MSP."94
Defendants will, therefore, be responsible to the government for
Medicare's payments to the beneficiary because the United
States may bring a reimbursement claim against primary
plans.95 If settlements do not explicitly include compensation for
past medical expenses, at a minimum, the defendant may have to
pay twice: once to the Medicare beneficiary for the settlement
and once to the government for its Medicare reimbursement
claim. 6 Plaintiffs are unlikely to agree to a settlement that
includes Medicare's expenses because then they are responsible
for reimbursement, which diminishes their recovery. Defendants
may face even greater financial burdens if settlements proceed
but fail to adequately protect Medicare's recovery rights,
thereby forcing the defendant to pay "double damages" to
Medicare on top of settlement costs.97 Since a settlement creates
additional, automatic liability to Medicare, "defendants will
perceive this as an additional cost of settlement and plaintiffs
will perceive the liability as reducing the amount that they
can expect to receive from a settlement."9 8 From a defendant's
perspective, increased settlement costs make litigation more
enticing because a victory would avoid plaintiff compensation
and Medicare reimbursement. From a plaintiffs standpoint, a
successful trial would provide a larger pool of money from which
they would have to reimburse Medicare.
2. Protection of Governmental Interests
Before Ahlborn, the government argued "that if States were
limited to recovering payments from third parties
for medical care and services, then recipients could prevent
state recovery by intentionally manipulating the amounts paid
'4 Swedloff, supra note 2, at 585.
9' See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii)-(iii).
See Swedloff, supra note 2, at 585.
9' See id. at 585-86.
98 Id. at 591.
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for various claims."99 Concern that a limited interpretation of
the government's reimbursement rights under the MSP would
lead the parties to the lawsuit to negotiate away the
government's interest, significantly diminishing recoupment
ability, lacks merit. First, strong incentives exist for attorneys,
plaintiffs, and defendants to respect the government's right of
reimbursement. Second, the government can protect its own
interest by joining in or initiating legal proceedings to assert
reimbursement rights. The picture painted went something like
this: Medicaid or Medicare recipients would collude with the
defendant to reduce the amount of the settlement representing
compensation for past medical expenses paid by the government,
or exclude it entirely, while increasing funds designated for
pain and suffering. 100  Attempts by plaintiffs to seek
compensation for only nonmedical expenses, specifically
excluding monies recoverable by the government, have been of
particular concern. 1 1
It is in the attorney's best interest to cooperate with
Medicare's recoupment efforts because his or her portion of the
settlement may be reduced if Medicare's interest is not satisfied.
Medicare may reduce the award of any person who attempts to
shift the primary cost of care to Medicare that "knew or should
have known about [Medicare's] payments but failed to protect
Medicare's recovery rights."' 2 Prudent attorneys are likely to
understand Medicare repayment obligations, and therefore, be
motivated by a possible reduction of their attorney fees. If
financial consequence is not enough, the looming possibility of
legal action against the attorney, detracting from his or her
valuable time and reputation, provides additional incentive.
Federal regulations state that CMS may sue "any entity,
9 Ahlborn v. Ark. Dep't of Human Servs., 397 F.3d 620, 627 (8th Cir. 2005),
affd, 547 U.S. 268 (2006).
100 See id.
101 See id. In North Carolina, for example, plaintiffs attempted to apportion
damages to avoid Medicaid liens. See Allen N. Trask, III, Comment, Orders from on
High: The Current Struggle over Medicaid Third Party Recovery Between North
Carolina and the Supreme Court of the United States, 30 CAMPBELL L. REV. 471, 487
(2008). Some commentators, however, argue that this is a desirable situation. J.
Michael Hayes contends that the government should exercise its independent right
to seek recovery, thus representing their own interests, and claimants should
restrict their personal injury claims to pain and suffering. See Hayes, supra note 44,
at 30.
102 Nyzio, supra note 68, at 23.
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including a beneficiary, provider, supplier, physician, attorney,
State agency or private insurer that has received a primary
payment."' Through these administrative regulations, the
government has put attorneys on notice that they will pursue
recovery of Medicare reimbursements from both plaintiffs
and attorneys-even after such settlement funds have been
dispersed. 104
The legal community has stressed the importance of
harmonizing the government's recovery goal with the tort
system's interest in adequately compensating injured plaintiffs.
For example, in seeking to reconcile North Carolina practices
with the Ahlborn decision, one commentator argued that North
Carolina should amend its statutes to mandate that the North
Carolina Division of Medical Assistance participate in settlement
negotiations.1 0 5 That type of an amendment would protect the
government's interest by precluding attempts to keep the
government in the dark while damages were apportioned in a
way that avoids the government's interests. 10 6 Additionally, a
recent article in the New York State Bar Journal suggests that
attorneys should provide Medicare with a copy of the complaint
at the start of the action. This would put Medicare on written
notice and advise Medicare to retain its own counsel so it may
join in the suit or start its own suit to pursue medical
expenses.0 7  In Ahlborn, the Supreme Court rejected the
government's concerns, instead suggesting that "the risk that
parties to a tort suit will allocate away the State's interest can be
avoided either by obtaining the State's advance agreement to an
allocation or, if necessary, by submitting the matter to a court for
decision."0 '
Finally, the government is well equipped to protect its own
interests by bringing its own actions or joining in the Medicare
beneficiary's suit to participate in settlement negotiations. The
government is authorized to recover Medicare expenses "in any
case in which [it] is authorized or required by law to ... pay for
hospital, medical, surgical, or dental care and treatment ... to a
103 42 C.F.R. § 411.24(g) (2010).
104 See Glenn E. Bradford & Melinda M. Ward, The Medicare "Super Lien"
Revisited, 56 J. Mo. B. 44, 45 (2000).
105 See Trask, supra note 101.
106 See id.
107 See Hayes, supra note 44, at 31.
108 Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 288 (2006).
20101
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
person who is injured.., under circumstances creating a tort
liability upon some third person... to pay damages therefor."10 9
First, the government has a right, independent of the injured
person, to recover the reasonable value of the care or treatment
that was furnished from third persons that caused the injury.""
Additionally, the government is subrogated to any right or claim
of the injured person,"' allowing the head of the department or
agency of the United States that furnished the care or treatment
provided for by the government to require the injured parties to
assign their rights to the government." 2 To enforce these rights,
it may "intervene or join in any action or proceeding brought by
the injured or diseased person. .. against the third person who is
liable for the injury ... or other entity responsible for the
payment or reimbursement of medical expenses. '"113 Further
protection is provided by the fact that, if no such action is
brought within six months after the care or treatment is paid
for by the United States, the government may "institute and
prosecute legal proceedings against the third person who is liable
for the injury ... or other entity responsible for the payment or
reimbursement of medical expenses."114 Thus, the government
need not fear that a limited recovery rule would harm its
recoupment efforts.
IV. APPLICATION
Applying the Medicaid rule established in Ahlborn to
Medicare requires apportioning settlement proceeds through a
mathematical formula or submitting the matter to a court for
determination. The Ahlborn formula, which reduces the
government's recovery by the fraction that the plaintiffs total
claim was reduced to through settlement, is an efficient and fair
apportionment method when the portion of the settlement meant
to compensate for past medical expenses is easily discernable. In
109 42 U.S.C. § 2651(a) (2006).
110 Id. ("[Tihe United States shall have a right to recover (independent of the
rights of the injured or diseased person) from said third person.., the reasonable
value of the care and treatment so furnished [or] paid for. ").
I" Id. ("[Tihe United States ... shall... be subrogated to any right or claim
that the injured or diseased person ... has against such third person to the extent of
the reasonable value of the care and treatment so furnished ....
112 Id.
113 Id. § 2651(d).
114 Id.
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other cases, judicial oversight can determine the relevant values,
ensuring a fair result for both plaintiffs and the government.
While judicial intervention requires significant resources, the fair
reconciliation of the government's financial interests with the
plaintiffs right to compensation is worth the trouble.
A. Ahlborn's Fractional Formula for Stipulated Past Medical
Expenses
The Ahlborn decision created a formula that would allow
courts to expeditiously determine the allocation of settlement
funds. The formula dictates that the court "should determine the
ratio between the settlement amount and the actual value of the
case, and then apply that same ratio to medical expenses." 5
In Ahlborn, the parties settled for $500,000.116 Later, they
stipulated that "the settlement amounted to approximately one-
sixth of [the reasonable value of Ahlborn's claim]; and that, if
Ahlborn's construction of federal law was correct, ADHS would
be entitled to only the portion of the settlement ($35,581.47) that
constituted reimbursement for medical payments made."117 The
total value of Ahlborn's claim was estimated at $3,040,708.12.111
Thus, ADHS would be entitled to about one-sixth of the
$215,645.30 lien-representing past medical expenses paid out
by Medicare-leaving them free to recoup $35,581.47 from the
settlement proceeds." 9 Where the parties to a lawsuit involving
Medicare reimbursement issues have stipulated the portion of
the settlement proceeds intended to compensate for past medical
expenses, courts should apply the fractional formula
Various courts have accepted the formula approach as a
rational apportionment method. 120 The Supreme Court gave no
indication of dissatisfaction with the formula, despite the fact
115 Lugo v. Beth Israel Med. Ctr., 13 Misc. 3d 681, 687, 819 N.Y.S.2d 892,
896-97 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2006).
116 Id.
"1 Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 274 (2006).
118 See id.
119 See id.
120 See, e.g., Lugo, 13 Misc. 3d at 687, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 897 (concluding that the
formula used in Ahlborn was rational); see also Robert W. Hambrecht,
'Lugo'/Allocation Hearing Ordered in Action To Recoup Medicaid, Medicare Liens,
N.Y. L.J., Sept. 10, 2007, at 19 (stating that, at first glance, an application of the
Ahlborn formula, which would reduce the Medicaid reimbursement to 3.4%
of the total settlement in the instant case, seemed to allow for a reasonable
recoupment).
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that it was stipulated to by the parties. On the contrary, the
court in Lugo surmised that the Supreme Court seems to fully
sanction that method of apportionment "by equating the
stipulation to a judicial determination allocating the award."12'
The Lugo Court stated that "the 'effect of the stipulation is the
same as if a trial judge had found that Ahlborn's [ability to
recover on the award of] damages' was limited in proportion to
the percent of comparative negligence determined by the
court."' 22
B. Judicial Allocation of Settlement Proceeds for Unstipulated
Past Medical Expenses
If parties to a lawsuit have not stipulated to apportionment
of a settlement, the court should still apply the fractional formula
by determining the allocation of settlement proceeds. As an
initial matter, the court should determine whether any medical
expenses were included in the settlement.1 23 Such a step would
provide the most protection to plaintiffs by ensuring that
Medicare has a right of recovery given the specific facts of the
case. 24 This type of direct, initial judicial oversight would also
alleviate concerns that "[a]pportionment of Medicare's recovery
in tort cases.. . would place Medicare at the mercy of a victim's
or personal injury attorney's estimate of damages."125
The court should then determine what portion of the
settlement represents compensation for past medical expenses.
The government should submit to judicial review if it is unable or
unwilling to resolve its claims with Medicare beneficiaries.
Although rare, the government has submitted to third-party
review in this area before. For example, when a neutral
arbitrator specifically designates certain funds for items not
121 Lugo, 13 Misc. 3d at 688, 819 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
122 Id. (quoting Ahlborn, 547 U.S. at 281 n.10).
123 See Harris v. City of N.Y., 16 Misc. 3d 674, 679-80, 837 N.Y.S.2d 486, 490
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 2007) ("[It is for the court to determine the extent to which a
personal injury settlement addresses the claim for past medical expenses. ... .");
Trask, supra note 101, at 486 ("The Ahlborn decision first requires that either the
parties, or the courts by decree, apportion the damages by category.").
124 See Thomas A. Moore & Matthew Gaier, Medicaid Liens Revisited, N.Y. L.J.,
June 3, 2008, at 3 (arguing that there is no reason that any proceeds of a settlement
should go to the Medicaid agency when the plaintiff settles for less than the full
amount of the case).
125 Zinman v. Shalala, 67 F.3d 841, 846 (9th Cir. 1995).
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related to medical expenses, such as pain and suffering,
"Medicare does not seek recovery from portions of court awards
that are designated as payment for losses other than medical
services ....126 Perhaps the government accepts reduction of its
claim because such allocations are the result of a court order on
the merits, alleviating fears that attorneys are colluding to
disadvantage the government out of its reimbursement interest.
Although damages in tort suits are less susceptible to
precise determination-and thus, would "require a factfinding
process to determine the actual damages" 127-the Supreme
Court has seemed to sanction judicial oversight of the process.
In Ahlborn, the Supreme Court concluded that allocation
may sometimes require "submitting the matter to a court for
decision."12 The Court reasoned that "just as there are risks in
underestimating the value of readily calculable damages in
settlement negotiations, so also is there a countervailing concern
that a rule of absolute priority might preclude settlement in a
large number of cases, and be unfair to the recipient in others."129
Judicial intervention is costly in terms of time and money,
but it is worthwhile to ensure a harmonious functioning of the
tort system and the Medicare program. History has shown that
cooperation between the injured party and Medicare is difficult
due to their competing interests. The Association of Trial
Lawyers of America has explained that "Medicare ... [is]
notorious for refusing to provide information regarding claimed
lien amounts until after a tort claim has been settled."130
Plaintiffs and defendants have attempted to exclude the
government from their settlements. A middle ground is required,
however, so that each side can maximize its recovery while
maintaining the effectiveness of the tort and Medicare systems.
Plaintiffs who are Medicare recipients benefit from a well-funded
Medicare program because they may need services in the future.
126 Matthew L. Garretson, What Does the Ahlborn Decision Really Mean?
Medicaid Reimbursement in Personal Injury Cases After Arkansas Dep't of Health &
Human Services v. Ahlborn, 36 TORTS, INS. & COMPENSATION L. SEC. J. 22, 24
(2007); see also Zinman v. Shalala, 835 F. Supp. 1163, 1167 (N.D. Cal. 1993), af/d,
67 F.3d 841.
127 Zinman, 67 F.3d at 846.
126 Ark. Dep't of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268, 271 (2006).
129 Id. at 288.
130 Brief of the Ass'n of Trial Lawyers of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 11, Ahlborn, 547 U.S. 268 (No. 04-1506).
2010]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
The Medicare program benefits from the recovery of adequate
funds by Medicare-recipient plaintiffs in that the plaintiffs will
become less dependent on public funding."'
CONCLUSION
The fact that Congress intended Medicare to be the
payer of last resort does not mean that Congress intended
for the government to be able to recoup its losses from funds
intended to compensate plaintiffs for nonmedical costs, such as
pain and suffering. The Supreme Court's determination that
the government's right to recoup Medicaid payments is
limited should guide judicial interpretation of government
reimbursement rights for Medicare because the programs have
the same basic repayment obligations-limiting recovery to
payments for medical expenses. A limited recovery rule may be
more difficult to implement than a blanket rule allowing full
recovery, but the aftermath of Ahlborn has shown that tort
victims need not suffer for the government to receive its just
compensation. In the end, the interests of the government and
the tort system can be reconciled.
131 See Russell, supra note 48, at 1064.
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